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NOTE
PROCESSING A MOTION ATTACKING SENTENCE
UNDER SECTION 2255 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE
Section 2255 of the Judicial Code 1 enables a federal prisoner seeking
release from an invalid sentence to launch his collateral attack in the original
sentencing court. The obvious relationship between the 2255 remedy and
habeas corpus, which is brought in the court of the district where the prisoner is confined, has generated confusion in the federal courts concerning
both the grounds on which relief may be granted and the proper procedure
for disposing of applications under section 2255. In two recent cases
argued the same day, the Supreme Court established certain guidelines.
In Hill v. United States,2 the Court reinforced its position that the grounds
on which relief may be sought under 2255 are "exactly commensurate"
with those available under habeas corpus. In Machibrodav. United States,3
18 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958):
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United Staies,
so that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence
to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof
to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or
otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or
infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the
judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the
judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner 'or resentence him or grant
a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered
on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
2368 U.S. 424 (1962).

8 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
(788)
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the Court ordered a hearing pursuant to a 2255 motion and elaborated upon
the procedure appropriate for disposition of such motions.
This Note will concentrate on the procedural problems of 2255 motions
and attempt to determine the optimum procedure under the statute which
will reduce through proper summary disposition the judicial burden which
has resulted from an ever-increasing number of 2255 motions 4 without
sacrificing that full consideration of his rights to which the movant is
entitled. The validity and utility of procedural rules and requirements
which the courts have formulated in fifteen years of interpreting the statute will be examined in light of the Machibroda decision.
I. BACKGaOUND AND SCOPE OF SEcTION 2255

The precursor of section 2255 was the motion to vacate sentence which
was developed in federal practice several years before its congressional
recognition in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code 1 and which was apparently designed to correct a prisoner's inability under habeas corpus to
collaterally attack the validity of a sentence he was not yet serving.8 The
statutory motion, however, was prompted by entirely different considerations. A series of Supreme Court decisions broadening the scope of habeas
corpus relief had triggered a significant increase in the number of habeas
corpus petitions. 7 To lighten the resultant workload on courts in the districts in which federal penitentiaries were located, Congress enacted section
2255 to permit a post-conviction motion in the sentencing court.3
Under section 2255, a federal prisoner seeking relief from an allegedly
invalid sentence is directed to the court that sentenced him before applying
4 In the fiscal year 1961, 560 motions were filed, an increase of 157 over 1960.
Relief was granted in only 3%o of the cases. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.
487, 497 (1962) (dissenting opinion). Statistics from 1948 are gathered in Harvey,
28 U.S.C. 2255: From Habeas Corpus to Coram Nobis, 1 WASHBURN L.J. 381, 391
(1961).
5 See, e.g., Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 741 (1944); Bell v. United States, 129 F2d 290 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 665 (1942).
6
See Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941).
Compare cases cited
note 5 mpra.
7 See Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OHio ST. L.J. 337, 341-57
1949). Some of the decisions were Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163
1873); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101
(1942).
8
See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212-19 (1952) ; Parker, Limiting
the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949). A secondary consideration was
the fact that in habeas corpus a trial judge might be called on to testify and defend
the regularity of the trial he supervised in another federal court. It was thought
that this detracted from the dignity of the court system. See Holtzoff Collateral
Review of Conzdctions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26, 5 3 (1945);
Parker, supra at 172-73. Yet a trial judge may still have to act as a witness in a
2255 hearing. See, e.g., Roddy v. United States, 296 F.2d 9 (10th Cir. 1961);
Davis v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 407 (D. Minn. 1954). A further reason for the
statute was the recognition that administratively it would be more feasible to bring
a prisoner to the district court where the files and records of his case as well as
the majority of witnesses needed at the hearing were located, than to transport these
records and witnesses to the court of the district of confinement. See United States
v. Hayman, supra at 220.
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to one of the few federal courts eligible to grant habeas corpus relief.
Indeed, habeas corpus is available only if the 2255 remedy is "inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." However, 2255 is not
the proper remedy for release from detention based on grounds other than
the imposition of an invalid sentence, for example, detention beyond the
term of a sentence; immediate application for habeas corpus is then necessary.9 As a narrow alternative to section 2255, Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure may be used to test the legality of the terms
of the sentence itself, for example, whether it exceeded the statutory limit
In addior whether multiple terms were imposed for the same offense.'
tion, the writ of error coram nobis provides a supplemental remedy for
challenging a sentence on grounds similar to those under 2255 when the
petitioner is not in custody; custody is a requirement for both habeas corpus
and 2255.11
II.

DISPOSING OF A

2255

MOTION WITHOUT TAKING EVIDENCE 12

A. Summary Denial Because of the Motion's Insufficiency
The statutory language governing summary denial of a 2255 motion
consists of a rather broad "unless" clause requiring judicial exposition.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court
shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States
9 See United States v. Koptik, 300 F.2d 19, 23 (7th Cir. 1962) (2255); Darnell
v. Looney, 239 F.2d 174 (10th Cir. 1956) (habeas corpus). Section 2255 is couched
in terms of invalidity of sentence whereas the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(1958), speaks of invalidity of custody. See generally Note, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985,

1006-08 (1962).

'C Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962).
1128 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958) (habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). The
courts have strictly construed the "in custody" requirement. But in Pollard v. United
States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957), the Court held that a 2255 case was not moot when
the petitioner was released from prison after certiorari had been granted. The opposite result was reached on identical facts in Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960),
when relief was sought by habeas corpus. As noted by Mr. Chief Justice Warren
in his dissent in Parker, id. at 586-87, that case and Heflin v. United States, 358
U.S. 415 (1959), a 2255 case subsequent to Pollard which held that there was no
jurisdiction to hear a motion challenging a sentence the prisoner was not yet serving,
have cast doubt on the vitality of Pollard. But cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 83 Sup.
Ct. 373 (1963). In United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), redress for one not
in custody was achieved by resurrecting the writ of error coram nobis. See also Thomas
v. United States, 271 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1959). But see Funkhouser v. United
States, 260 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 940 (1959) ; United States
v. Baker, 158 F. Supp. 842 (MD. Ark. 1958), aff'd, 271 F2d 190 (8th Cir. 1959).
12 As with habeas corpus petitions, some 2255 motions filed with the clerk of the
court probably never reach any judge. See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945). A prisoner confronted with this situation
would be well advised to direct his motion or habeas corpus petition to a judge personally. Section 2255 states that the motion should be directed to the sentencing
court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). However, motions have been initiated by informal
letters to the trial judge. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 216 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.
1954); Burleson v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Mo. 1962). A habeas
corpus petition may be addressed to a Supreme Court Justice, circuit judge, or the
court in the confinement district. 28 U.S.C. §2242 (1958).
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attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues
and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
13
thereto.
1. The Factual Pleading Requirement
A motion is initially screened for compliance with the basic habeas
corpus or 2255 pleading requirement that it state facts, not conclusions,
which demonstrate the invalidity of the detention. 14 The Supreme Court
has long recognized that motions filed by a prisoner pro se should not be
scrutinized for "technical niceties" 15 since a prisoner is almost always
unskilled in the law and cannot be held to a high standard of pleading. The
scope of the factual pleading requirement depends ultimately on the objectives which the courts may legitimately pursue at this stage of the
proceeding.
Certainly a motion which is not based on at least one of the four
grounds for relief enumerated in section 2255-(1) "that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States";
(2) "that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence";
(3) "that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law";
(4) that the sentence "is otherwise subject to collateral attack" 1'-should
be denied at the pleading stage. Therefore, as a minimal requirement, a
motion must allege facts sufficient to inform the court of the grounds on
which the prisoner is relying. Mindful of the principle against requiring
"technical niceties," however, the courts should not insist that a prisoner
plead technically precise, legal arguments if the motion adequately indicates
his basis for complaint.
2. The Gordon Distortion
In Gordon v. United States,17 the petitioner alleged that because he
was eighteen at the time of trial, lacked family and friends to advise him,
was sentenced only four days after arrest, and was induced by government agents to plead guilty, he "could not possibly have intelligently or
competently waived [his]

. . . right of counsel." 18

The Court of Ap-

peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion
in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, 19 holding that the circumstances
1328 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).

14
E.g., United States v. Schultz, 286 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1961) ; United States v.
Morin, 265 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1959); Walker v. United States, 218 F.2d 80
(7th Cir. 1955).
3.5 See, e.g., Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) ; Cochran v. Kansas, 316
U.S. 255 (1942) ; Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 350 (1941) ; cf. Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266, 292-94 (1948).
16 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
17 216 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1954).
18 Id. at 496.
19 The court indicated that the factual pleading requirement in corain nobis
motions is the same as in 2255 motions. See ibid. See generally United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511-12 (1954).
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alleged did not necessarily imply an invalid waiver of counsel. The court
did note that if the petitioner was not informed of his right to counsel, the
sentence might have been vacated, 20 but found that he had not made this
allegation since he claimed only that he believed he was not informed.
The petitioner's motion consisted of two informal letters evincing his lack
of legal sophistication; obviously, he did not realize the importance of
accurately pleading the trial judge's failure to inform him of his rights.
And even had the trial judge made such an attempt, it may have been
so perfunctory as to have been ineffective. Waiver cannot be implied
from a silent record,2 1 and the records in the Gordon case were silent as to
whether any instructions had been given. Nevertheless, the court in effect
implied a waiver by failing to inquire further when it was at least put on
notice that the prisoner might not have been informed of his rights. No
doubt a motion drafted by a lawyer would have forcefully asserted that
the prisoner was not informed, relying on the prisoner's belief and the lack
of any record evidence to the contrary. The prisoner pro se should not be
precluded from a hearing by a pleading defect which a lawyer could easily
have avoided. Often, the trial records are used to supplement incomplete
pleadings; 22 their silence in Gordon could have been used to support the
prisoner's belief.23
Even if there had been no allegation that the prisoner was not informed
of his rights, the summary dismissal in Gordon would still be an improper
expansion of the factual pleading requirement. Denying a hearing because
the prisoner does not demonstrate that he is necessarily entitled to relief
reverses the direction of the statute which awards a hearing unless the
"motion . . . conclusively shows that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief." Moreover, in none of the Supreme Court discussions of the factual
pleading requirement is there a suggestion that the motion must be dismissed if the alleged legal conclusion does not necessarily follow from the
pleaded facts.2 4
By demanding that the precise facts upon which he relies be pleaded,
the factual pleading requirement places a burden on the 2255 movant to
which the ordinary civil plaintiff is not subjected, for, under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is awarded only if the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be
20
216 F.2d at 497-98.
21
See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) ; United States v. Lavelle,
306 F2d 216 (2,d Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Tribote, 297 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1961);
cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
22
See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F2d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890
(1945) (habeas corpus).
23 It could be argued that in order to discourage fictitious claims, a prisoner should
be required to affirmatively assert facts essential to his claim so that prosecutions
for false swearing or perjury could be instituted should it later be found that he was
lying. See Burleson v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Mo. 1962). In
Gordon, the motion was unsworn. See 216 F.2d at 498.
(2255); United
24See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962)
States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 24 (1942) (habeas corpus); Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 284 (1941) (habeas corpus).
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proven in support of his claim. 25 When a prisoner does allege all of the
particular facts on which he relies,26 he should not be denied an opportunity
to prove at a hearing that they support his conclusion unless the court is
certain, as a matter of substantive law, that the facts pleaded do not entitle
the prisoner to relief.2 7 A hearing should be granted when, as in Gordon,
the court is left in doubt. Since the ability to comprehend varies significantly among defendants, it is both unrealistic and damaging for a
court to rule that any prisoner must necessarily have made an intelligent
and voluntary waiver of counsel under the circumstances alleged in Gordon.
There is no such doubt as to the prisoner's claim for relief in the
numerous cases of summary denials of motions alleging ineffective counsel
in which the courts have held that various counsel tactics do not amount
to a "mockery of justice" as a matter of law; 28 here the courts have demanded precise factual statements so that the legal standard could properly
be applied to the pleadings. In United States v. Pisciotta,29 the prisoner
alleged that his guilty plea was not voluntary or intelligent because his
counsel failed to inform the court of his desire to plead not guilty and of
facts proving his innocence. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
did not consider whether a plea could be vacated solely on the ground that
the lawyer failed to plead in accordance with the prisoner's wishes; it held
the motion insufficient to establish a claim of ineffective counsel because it
did not allege the "circumstances" involved or the facts proving innocence
which the prisoner instructed his counsel to present to the court. The
court may have wanted these facts pleaded so it could decide for itself what
would have been the most appropriate plea and determine whether there
was enough admissible evidence disproving guilt to make the lawyer's
failure to present it more than mere trial tactics or permissible misjudgment5 0
25
E.g., Kennedy v. Bennett, 261 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Frederick Hart &
Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir. 1948).
26 One court has equated the factual detail to that required under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d 826, 833 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956). It is unclear whether this detail is required only
to enable the court to determine whether the motion states sufficient legal grounds
for relief, see Green v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Mass. 1958), or
whether the Government must also be informed of the evidence on which the prisoner
relies. See Taylor v. United States, supra at 833.
27The same test is applied under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Clarke
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 298 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir. 1962).
28 See Martin v. United States, 248 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1957), in which the
court held that refusal by counsel to object to the admission of narcotics illegally
obtained does not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel since he
could have had good reason therefor, such as that to object would have been to admit
that defendant possessed the narcotics. This method of deciding motions claiming
ineffective counsel was followed in Wilkins v. United States, 258 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 942 (1958), and Jones v. United States, 258 F.2d 420 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 932 (1958). Cf. O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d
733 (6th Cir. 1961); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
29199 F2d 603 (2d Cir. 1952).

30 See 199 F.2d at 607.
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Gordon and other cases in the area exemplify the problem created by
a motion insufficiently pleading one particular element necessary for successful collateral attack. If the court summarily denies relief, a deserving
prisoner may be irreparably prejudiced, for in fact the necessary element
may have occurred but the prisoner may be unaware of or unable to express
its significance. If the court adequately informs the prisoner of the motion's
deficiency, a corrective amendment probably will follow regardless of
whether the missing element has in fact occurred. In these circumstances,
the court should appoint counsel for the prisoner to present the case in its
most effective legal framework undiluted by contentions known to be false.
3. Pleadings Indicating the Prisoner's Inability
To Offer Competent Evidence
a. Alleging Incompetency at Trial
In processing pleadings claiming incompetency at the time of trial, the
courts seem to have taken into account the prisoner's inability to gather
facts to support his conclusion or to competently testify himself, and have
required only something other than the prisoner's bare claim that he was
incompetent.3 ' Thus, 2255 pleadings have been held factually sufficient to
command a hearing which alleged only that the prisoner had a history of
mental incompetency before trial,32 or that he was placed in a mental hospital after trial, 3 or even that the trial judge recommended psychiatric
care.3 From none of these facts would it necessarily follow that the prisoner was incompetent at the time of trial. Yet, in contrast to Gordon, the
courts did not summarily dismiss the motion.
b. Alleging Knozwing Use of Perjured Testimony
However, pleading challenges have often been successful in cases in
which the knowing use of perjured testimony has been alleged. In United
States v. Spadafora, 5 a motion which named government agents who would
testify that they perjured themselves was held insufficient because the
prisoner failed to point to any place in the record which could properly
be a basis for the claim. To require that perjury be apparent on the face
of the record is to ignore the fact that seemingly truthful and consistent
testimony can be overturned by knowledge not revealed by the trial record.
Spadafora was later cited to support denial of a hearing despite the prisoner's affidavit that named persons would testify that they perjured them31 See United States v. Walker, 301 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1962). But see Burrow
v. United States, 301 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. McNicholas, 298

F2d 914 (4th Cir.), cert. dentied, 369 U.S. 878 (1962).

a2 See Meadows v. United States, 282 F2d 942 (5th Cir. 1960); Taylor v.
United States, 282 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1960).
83
See Gregori v. United States, 243 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1957).
34 See Praylow v. United States, 298 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1962).
85 200 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1952).
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selves and that the prosecutor knew it.3 6 Nevertheless, hearings have been
granted on such affidavits,3 7 and in one case in which the prisoner had no
personal knowledge that the perjury was knowingly used, the court imputed
38
knowledge to the prosecutor since the alleged perjurer was a police officer.
But in Taylor v. United States,3 9 the court would not impute to the prosecutor knowledge of records of the Narcotics Bureau which showed that
a government witness who testified that he did not use narcotics was in fact
arrested for possession of narcotics. The court indicated that it could not
find a "meritorious case" without some evidence of knowing use of perjured testimony other than the prisoner's contention.
c. Allegations Based on Hearsay
In Green v. United States,40 the prisoner alleged that after trial one
witness told another that he had made a deal with the prosecutor to perjure
himself. The motion was denied as being based on the "rankest hearsay"
.unsupported by independent relevant evidence. The court noted that even
if the hearsay was admitted at a hearing, it would not justify vacating the
sentence. In Catalano v. United States,41 the prisoner alleged that an
unidentified deputy marshal told him that the prosecutor was in the jury
room; in Johnson v. United States,4 2 the prisoner alleged that unauthorized
persons were in the jury room and that he was denied essential witnesses
because of coercion and threats by an assistant United States Attorney.
Both of these motions were denied as being based on hearsay, the court in
Catalano characterizing the allegations as "unsupported" and the Johnson
court concluding that the accusations were "obviously nebulous and false."
These cases in which a motion was held insufficient because facts
essential to the claim were based on the prisoner's hearsay statements are
closely related to the perjured testimony and incompetency cases. In all
of the cases the prisoner was unable to testify competently to the relevant
ultimate issue but could swear only as to the existence of other testimony.
In the incompetency cases, the motion itself did not state facts which if
proven would warrant relief any more than did the motions in the hearsay
and perjured testimony cases; yet the courts were willing to probe further
in the incompetency cases. That same willingness should be evident in the
perjured testimony and hearsay cases, particularly since several courts have
36
United States v. Mathison, 159 F. Supp. 811, 813 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 256 F.2d
803 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 857 (1958).
37 See United States v. Jakasli, 237 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 939 (1957) ; cf. United States v. Davis, 286 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1961).
38 United States v. Derosier, 229 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1956).
39 229 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1956) ; cf. Sanders v. United States, 183 F.2d 748 (4th
Cir. 1950) (per curiam) (that prosecutor knew testimony was elicited through "suggestive interrogation" does not support claim that he knew it was false).
40 158 F. Supp. 804 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958).
41 185 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 281 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.
1960).
42239 F2d 698 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957).
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recognized that a prisoner's rights cannot be effectively safeguarded unless
a hearing is provided, regardless of whether it initially appears that he will
be unable to prove his case. 3 In the hearsay and perjured testimony cases,
when the motion documents the evidence which the prisoner intends to
present, summary denial without further investigation is unwarranted, for
if those on whom the prisoner relied could testify, there would be sufficient
evidence to support the claim. Thus, the opinion in Catalano shows that the
court attempted to investigate the existence of the witness on whom the
prisoner of necessity relied." And in Green, the opinion indicates that the
prisoner was able to identify only one of his two essential witnesses, so that
even if that one witness testified at a hearing, the alleged perjurer's hearsay
statement would remain unverified. 45 But in Johnson, it is not clear
whether the court even asked the prisoner to identify the witnesses who
were allegedly coerced. Apparently, the court used the hearsay ground to
46
mask its subjective disbelief of the prisoner.
In the perjured testimony cases, the courts are perhaps reluctant to
grant a hearing for fear that they themselves will be exposed to perjury
on the part of a person amicable to the prisoner's cause. On the other hand,
in the incompetency cases the testimony of presumably disinterested doctors
controls the factual issue. Yet it is difficult to square Spadafora with this
distinction since the prisoner's witnesses in that case were government
agents. In any event, the possibility of false testimony at the hearing seems
an inadequate ground for denying a hearing altogether. Conceding that a
court even after a hearing cannot be certain whether testimony was true
or false, there is surely no greater certainty when the court denies relief
before the witness on whom the prisoner relies has testified and is crossexamined. If the prisoner has alleged that there are in fact witnesses who
will testify in his behalf, this should be accepted as true and as requiring
further investigation. Courts have proceeded to a hearing in the incompetency cases with no assurance that the prisoner had experts to testify
for him; and, as in the hearsay cases, the perjured testimony claim can be
adequately investigated merely by seeking affidavits from the witnesses
whom the prisoner pro se probably cannot reach because of his incarceration.47 Rather than court investigation, hoWever, the matter should be
e.g., United States v. Tribote, 297 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1961) ; United States
4See,
v. Salerno, 290 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1961); Vellky v. United States, 279 F.2d 697 (6th
Cir. 1960).
44 Apparently in response to court inquiry, the prisoner was unable to identify
the marshall. See United States v. Catalano, 281 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 845 (1960).
45 The per curiam opinion on appeal, 256 F.2d 483, states that Green had an
affidavit from his co-defendant who allegedly overheard the perjurer, but there is
nothing to indicate that the perjurer was identified. Compare United States v.
Comulada, 155 F. Supp. 266, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (prisoner must allege nature of
perjury and identify his witnesses and what they will testify).
46The court viewed the prisoner's claim as "palpably incredible" so that it would
be "against sound public policy" to bring Johnson to a hearing. 239 F.2d at 699.
47 See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)
(affidavit by perjurer claiming he
testified under police threat requires investigation).
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referred to a lawyer or Public Defender to ensure adequate presentation of
the facts underlying the alleged invalidity of the prisoner's conviction.
4. Frivolous Claims
Underlying the dismissal of many 2255 motions is the fallacious and
usually unarticulated assumption that because so many post-conviction
movants are unworthy of relief, each particular claim is to be viewed as
presumptively frivolous. 48 This approach is not only illogical, but also
destructive of the basic aim of the post-conviction remedy to provide a
reasonable opportunity to overturn defective convictions. Relief granted
any one prisoner inevitably evokes some frivolous claims; but. the attitude
of presumptive frivolousness is a solution far worse than the problem.
In Malone v. United States,49 the prisoner alleged that he was incompetent at the time of trial due to the influence of opium which he had concealed on his person for six months while in jail awaiting trial and which
he had taken at the time of trial. Although apparently deciding the case
on other grounds, 50 the court stated that the motion was insufficient because
the prisoner had not substantiated his conclusion by allegations of fact which
were likely to be true. Obviously the court was wary of such a claim, for
unlike the claim of incompetency due to insanity, this claim rested solely
on the prisoner's own testimony. Equally obvious, however, is the fact that
the motion did state facts which, if proven, warranted relief. Indeed, the
court's testing of the facts for some sort of inherent verity conflicted with
the Supreme Court's pronouncement that allegations are to be treated as
51
true no matter how improbable.
The Malone-type "probability of veracity" bar seems to have been
invoked in scattered decisions 52 and, if extended, could deny relief to pris48 See United States v. Estep, 151 F. Supp. 668 (N.D. Tex. 1957) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners,108 U. PA. L. Rnv.
461, 472 (1960). See generally Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1947).
49299 F2d 254 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 863 (1962).
50 The motion was the prisoner's second, and although it was based on different
factual and legal grounds, the court held that the trial judge could in his discretion
dismiss it. See note 82 infra and accompanying text.
51 See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (habeas corpus) ; Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 287 (1941) (habeas corpus). Accord, United States v.
Tribote, 297 F2d 598 (2d Cir. 1961); Alexander v. United States, 290 F.2d 252
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 891 (1961); Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d
750, 753 (5th Cir. 1955).
52 See United States v. McNicholas, 298 F.2d 914 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 878 (1962); United States v. Thomas, 291 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1961); O'Malley
v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961). Compare Reickauer v. Cunningham,
299 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1962) (habeas corpus). In Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v.
Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956), the Court stated that "factual allegations not patently
frivolous or false on a consideration of the whole record' should not be summarily
dismissed. Id. at 119. Other cases, cited note 51 supra, indicate that this statement
should be read as justifying subjective disbelief of the facts alleged only if there are
facts in the record which directly or by a reasonable inference undermine a contention
of the prisoner. See notes 115, 123 infra and accompanying text It should not be
sufficient that the record as a whole indicates that the claim is probably false because
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oners whose rights have in fact been severely infringed while granting relief
or at least a hearing to those whose allegations appear more plausible.
Section 2255 requires that the court be persuaded that the prisoner's papers
"conclusively show" that he is entitled to no relief before summarily denying the motion; certainly the justifications variously given by the courts
for what might be termed subjective disbelief of a claim fall far short of a
conclusive determination. One court justified its disbelief on the ground
that a deserving prisoner would not have waited six years to bring his
motion.63 Although delay in filing a motion is a credibility factor to be
considered at a hearing,54 there are too many valid causes for delay-for
example, unawareness of possible rights-to make this factor conclusive
in barring a hearing. In fact, other courts have held that failure to excuse
a delay need not be pleaded 55 and that laches does not bar relief for an
otherwise valid claim. 56 In the words of the statute itself, a motion "may
be brought at any time." Other justifications for summarily dismissing a
claim based on inferences from the fact that a prisoner had a criminal record-for example, that an experienced convict was probably not frightened
by police threats 57 -have also been discredited. 58 A prison background is
hardly a logical reason to deny a prisoner full recourse to a remedy available only to prisoners.
Lack of corroborating evidence is another frequently asserted rationalization for disbelieving the allegations of a prisoner's motion in the name
of protecting the court's processes from abuse. In United States v. Smith,59
the court denied a hearing on a claim of coerced guilty plea because the
prisoner had failed to protest his innocence at sentencing and had not
pointed to corroborating sources of evidence to support his motion. Similarly, in United States v. McNicholas,

the court stated that a prisoner

who claimed he was incompetent at trial due to drug addiction should not
have been entitled to a hearing since there was no ground for his complaint
the prisoner was afforded every right at trial, for Claudy held that a claim of coerced
guilty plea was not rendered frivolous when the prisoner threw himself on the mercy
of the court, waited eight years to bring his petition, and had prior experience with
criminal procedure.
53
United States v. Newman, 126 F. Supp. 94, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (review of
second motion raising different claim from first); cf. United States v. Lowe, 173
F2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 944 (1949) ; note 143 infra and accompanying text.
54See Aiken v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 43, 49-50 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 296
F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1961).
55
United States v. Urrutia, 160 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Fla. 1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d
501 (5th Cir.), rez'd per curiam on confession of error, 357 U.S. 577 (1958).
51United States v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1955), reversing 122 F.
Supp. 623 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); see Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959)
(concurring opinion).
57 See United States v. Smith, 257 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 926
(1959).
8
See, e.g., United States v. Lavelle, 306 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1962) ; United States
v. Tribote, 297 F2d 598 (2d Cir. 1961).
59257 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 926 (1959) (coram nobis).
0298 F2d 914 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 878 (1962).

1963]

PROCESSING A SECTION 2255 MOTION

in the files of the case. In both cases, the motion itself was not obviously
insufficient, and the facts alleged, if proven, could support relief. A desire
to check frivolous claims does not justify denial of a hearing because there
is no source of evidence other than the prisoner's projected testimony. The
McNicholas court completely reversed the language of the statute by
formulating a test of "whether the entire record and surrounding circumstances negate a conclusive showing that [the prisoner]

. . . is entitled

to no relief." 61 In Machibroda v. United States,62 the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the Government's argument for dismissal of a motion
claiming coercion of a guilty plea by the prosecutor because of the lack of
eyewitnesses other than the prisoner and the prosecutor. A hearing was
ordered even though Machibroda's story was uncorroborated and other
facts alleged were inaccurate. 63
Some courts, in summarily denying motions, have relied to an extent
on the prisoner's failure to assert his innocence of the charge.!4 These
decisions have also been discredited,6 5 for the issue on collateral attack
is not the guilt of the accused but the regularity of the proceedings. Moreover, to require denial of guilt will not prevent frivolous motions, for it is a
simple matter to profess innocence.
B. Denial Without Hearing of the Legally Sufficient Motion
1. The Inconsistent Motion

A motion which alleges adequate grounds for relief in sufficient factual
detail may nevertheless be dismissed without further investigation. In
Black v. United States,66 the prisoner claimed he was deprived of a fair
trial because an informer was not called to testify, was not a credible witness, and declined to testify by invoking the fifth amendment. The court,
referring to the obvious inconsistency of the motion, affirmed the denial of
a hearing after discovering that the informer was called to the witness stand.
Significantly, the court could discern whether the inconsistency- undermined
the claim only after further inquiry. That one unschooled in the law would
probably allege all possible reasons why relief should be granted regardless
of consistency suggests that the motion should not be summarily dismissed
without an attempt to clarify the factual situation, especially when the inconsistency-for example, one of chronology-is not crucial to the legal
result.
61298 F2d at 916.
62 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
63 See note 127 infra.
64 See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 847 (1958) (joint motion under 2255 and Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure) ; Hart v. United States, 178 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 985 (1950); United States v. Newman, 126 F. Supp. 94, 97 (D.C. Cir.
1954); United States v. Calp, 83 F. Supp. 152 (D. Md. 1949).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Lavelle, 306 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1962); Allen v.
United States, 102 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. I1. 1952).
66269 F.2d 38, 42 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1960).
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Inconsistency was also noted in one case as a reason for disbelieving on
its face a prisoner's claim that counsel coerced him, since the prisoner had
requested that same lawyer to represent him in an appeal from the dismissal of a prior motion.67 But it does not necessarily follow that because
he requested the same lawyer he was not coerced. He may not have known
that he was entitled to a different counsel on filing his motion, or the lawyer
may in fact have been willing to support the claim; the inconsistency, therefore, did not justify disbelief and summary dismissal.
2. The Trial Judge's Recollections
a. Factual Issues
A motion may be summarily denied when the claim is based on allegations which conflict with facts of which a court can take judicial notice. 68
However, the courts have split in evaluating the significance of contrary
facts that could be established only by the judge's personal recollections.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has consistently given effect 6 9
to the belief of Judge Parker, a member of the Judicial Conference which
drafted section 2255, that the remedy would be effective in limiting frivolous
claims because of the trial judge's ability to utilize his personal recollections.70 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has taken the opposite
approach by suggesting that the motion be brought before a district court
judge other than the trial judge, particularly when the trial judge will be
71
a material witness at a possible hearing.
In practice, the sentencing judge may actually favor the prisoner by
discounting his own memory to a greater degree than would one of his
fellow judges. Nevertheless, the desirability of separating the conflicting
roles of trier and presenter of fact persuasively argues for the Second Circuit
approach. As authority for its procedure, the Second Circuit cited the
Supreme Court holding that a trial judge cannot act as a one-man grand jury
because of the problem of detaching himself from what occurred in the secret
grand jury session and because his recollection is likely to outweigh testimony given at the trial.72 Even when a judge has no evidence to present,
his familiarity with the case may not be enough to overcome the disadvantages caused by the set of preconceived opinions he brings with him from the
trial. Therefore, a judge should disqualify himself from determining an
issue of fact unless it appears that his testimony or recollections could in no
67 United States v.* Newman, 126 F. Supp. 94, 98 (D.D.C. 1954).
Compare
Jenkins v. United States, 249 F.2d 105, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
68
See Wheatley v. United States, 198 F.2d 325, 327 (10th Cir. 1952) (dictum).•
69 See, e.g., Hodge v. United States, 217 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 959 (1955) ; Miller v. United States, 222 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1955) (per curiam);
Hines v. United States, 203 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1953) (per curiam).
70 See Carvell v. United States, 173 F2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam). See
generally Parker, Limiting the Aluse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949).
71 See United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam);
United
States v. Halley, 240 F._d 418 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
72
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
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event be offset by the prisoner's evidence. 73 It is unlikely, however, that
many trial judges would be receptive to such a suggestion. In Reiff v.
United States,74 the prisoner contended that his defense counsel had asked
for bribe money with the judge's knowledge, but that same judge dismissed
the motion as "scurrilous" and refused to take evidence on it. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claim was not
prejudged even though it was not established that the prisoner had no
evidence other than his own testimony. This affirmance was sound, however, if the prisoner's theory on appeal was not that he had evidence which
was prematurely discounted but only that the trial judge should not have
been permitted to entertain the motion.
b. Legal Sufficiency
Obviously, the prisoner has a significant interest in having a different
judge pass on the legal sufficiency of a claim that involves the trial judge's
integrity. Yet when a defendant raises a claim at trial of a judge's prejudice or bias, .that judge first passes on the question of whether the accompanying affidavit presents facts which give "fair support to the charge of
bent mind." Only if the challenged judge finds "fair support" will the
factual issues in the case then be decided by another judge. 75 Certainly
a 2255 judge should be given the same opportunity to entertain a motion
attacking his integrity. 76 Although the prisoner may experience delay
by having to appeal an adverse decision resulting from the judge's involvement in the case-a greater hardship to one languishing in jail than to a
criminal defendant not yet imprisoned-, he nonetheless is assured that
the sufficiency of his claim will eventually be passed on by others. A
judge's involvement is less likely to color his decision when the prisoner's
claim concerns only the legal significance of the judge's actions at trialfor example, whether he complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
,Criminal Procedure in accepting a guiltj plea-; indeed, his familiarity with
the case provides him with a unique background to analyze the significance
of what occurred at trial.
When deciding the legal sufficiency of a claim, the judge should of
course recognize that the passage of time undermines the reliability of his
memory and that section 2255 requires conclusive determinations for
summary denial. Thus, the judge should not rely on his recollection that
the facts probably were otherise-for example, when he knows that it was
73

In Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958), the Supreme Court dis-

counted the judge's recollection for purposes of summary dismissal by ordering a
hearing on the factual issue of whether the evidence at trial showed that the prisoner
fired one or more than one shot.
74 299 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1962).
75 United States v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1954).
76 Especially since a judge's bias against post-conviction attacks in general might
be intensified were he precluded from at least passing on the legal sufficiency of a
claim involving a personal charge against him.
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his practice to inform defendants of their rights but is uncertain whether
77
the practice was followed in this case.
Judges have at times improperly utilized their recollection to inject an
opinion into the case which should not have controlled the result. In
United States v. Estep,78 the district judge precluded further investigation
by taking "judicial notice" of the fact that counsel was sober at trial. However, Bostic v. United States 79 held that although the judge may have
believed that the movant was rational in testifying at trial, a hearing was
required to determine his competency. These cases in which the judge's
opinion was not based on any peculiar expertise are distinguishable from
those in which the judge's opinion must necessarily be determinative of the
issue, such as whether a lawyer effectively conducted a trial.80
C. Successive 2255 Motions: Pleading an Adequate Excuse
Unlike the conclusive showing standard for summary denial of first
motions, the statute gives the courts discretion in determining whether to
hear a second 2255 motion. "The sentencing court shall not be required to
entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the
same prisoner." The extent and significance of this discretion turn on the
interpretation of "for similar relief." It is universally agreed that if a
second motion is based on the same legal and factual grounds as the first, a
court is entirely free to dismiss it.81 Some courts hold that this discretion
extends to any successive motion regardless of whether it presents new
grounds, either factual, legal, or both, since the prisoner is seeking the same
relief-vacation of his sentence.82 Other courts,8 however, have recognized
that if the purpose of section 2255-to relieve the courts in commitment districts from their habeas corpus workload-is to be furthered, "for similar
77 See Davis v. United States, 210 F.2d 118, 122 (8th Cir. 1954) ; United States
v. Ray, 183 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1960). Compare United States v. McDowell, 305
F.2d 12, 15 (6th Cir. 1962); United States v. Estep, 151 F. Supp. 668 (N.D. Tex.
1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1958).

78 Ibid.

79 298 F2d 678, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
80 See Wheatley v. United States, 198 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1952).
S1 See, e.g., Hobbs v. Pepersack, 301 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1962) (habeas corpus);
Ray v. United States, 295 F. 2d 416 (10th Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 875 (1962) ; Stoneldng v. United States, 286 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 940 (1961). Compare Kyle v. United States, 297 F2d 507
(2d Cir. 1961) (same legal grounds but new facts which put the case in a sufficiently
different light to warrant a hearing).
82 See Malone v. United States, 299 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
863 (1962) ; Sanders v. United States, 297 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. granted,
370 U.S. 936 (1962). The Malone decision is an extension of Dunn v. United States,
245 F2d 407 (6th Cir. 1957), in which the court noted that if a new factual issue
is presented, the case must be entertained unless a "defensive plea in the nature of
abuse of judicial process is interposed." The Dunn court cited Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266 (1948), which held that the prosecutor must raise the plea.
S See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 270 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Barrett v.
Hunter, 180 F.2d 510 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950).
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relief" must be read in terms of habeas corpus practice. s4 If the 2255
movant is not given the same opportunity as the habeas corpus petitioner
to at least have his claim heard, the 2255 procedure will be "inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention" and habeas corpus will therefore be available. Moreover, there is no indication in the legislative history
that the 2255 movant is to be accorded lesser rights than the habeas corpus
petitioner in the area of successive motions 8 5
The habeas corpus statute provides that a court need not entertain a
successive petition if the legality of the prisoner's detention has been determined on a prior application, "the petition presents no new ground not
theretofore presented and determined," and the court "is satisfied that the
ends of justice will not be served by . . . [the present] inquiry." 8' The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which has employed
habeas corpus procedure for successive 2255 motions, divided on the means7
ing of "new ground" in an en banc decision in Smith v. United States.
Judge Fahy defined a "new ground" as one not previously presented, so
that a court would have no discretion to refuse a petition asserting such a
ground.88 Judge Prettyman focused on the word "new" and concluded that
a ground is not new if it existed at the time of the first petition.8 9 However,
84 The clause is interpreted by reading "for similar relief" to mean "on similar
grounds!' The habeas corpus statute is quoted in text accompanying note 86 infra.
See, e.g., Juelich v. United States, 300 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Lipscomb v. United
States, 298 F.2d 9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 853 (1962) (judge has discretion,
and if there are new grounds, he ordinarily should entertain as in habeas corpus) ;
Green v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 804, 808-09 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiarn, 256

F2d 483 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958).

s5 Actually, there is no history behind the clause, so that guidance may only be
sought from the history of the habeas corpus statute, which is certainly relevant in
view of the congressional purpose to alleviate the habeas corpus burden. This construction of 2255 has the additional virtue of avoiding the constitutional question
of whether Congress could apply the res judicata principle to habeas corpus procedure
or its 2255 substitute, although there is nothing in the history of the habeas corpus
statute to indicate that Congress intended to utilize res judicata to its constitutional
limits. Dictum in Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510, 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 897 (1950), indicates that it would not be an unconstitutional suspension of the
writ for Congress to strictly apply the principle of res judicata to habeas corpus
practice. The court did not elaborate other than to say that the principle has been
applied in several states. Cf. United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 902 (1954) (dictum) (complete denial of the writ not unconstitutional since at common law the writ was not available to test the legality of a
conviction); Jones v. Squiers, 195 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1952) (dictum) (Congress
has power over scope of habeas corpus or its substitute). See generally Collings,
Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAI.
L. Rxv. 335 (1952). A strong argument to the contrary could be made when habeas
corpus is brought to test the legality of detention in a mental institution, for the
legality of this commitment-unlike commitment under criminal sentence-involves
an issue that changes with time. See Stewart v. Overholser, 186 F.2d 339, 343-44
(D.C. Cir. 1950).
8828 U.S.C. §2244 (1958).
s7 270 F.2d 921 (D. C. Cir. 1959).
88Id. at 925.
s9 Id. at 929-30. Judge Prettyman seems to have ignored the language of the
statute: "new ground not theretofore presented and determined .

§ 2244 (1958).
abstract.

.

.

."

28 U.S.C.

"Presented" should require something more than existence in the

804

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.ll1:788

since Judge Prettyman would apparently entertain a successive motion if
the prisoner adequately excused his failure to originally present the "new
ground," " and Judge Fahy would dismiss a successive motion on a charge
by the Government of abuse of the remedy unless the movant justified his
failure to originally present the claim, 91 the difference in their positions
seems to reduce to a disagreement as to whether the prisoner must plead his
excuse in the second motion. Both judges agree that the prisoner's ignorance of the facts underlying his claim or of their significance would constitute sufficient excuse.

92

Similarly, some of the courts interpreting the 2255 statute as conferring discretion over any successive motion would probably entertain
the motion if the prisoner established an adequate excuse,93 although others
have indicated that the discretion may be unpredictably broad.9 Ideally,
a judge should entertain a motion without an excuse being pleaded but deny
relief if the records of the case show that the movant had prior knowledge
of the facts now relied on. 95 Relief should also be denied if the Government charges abuse and the prisoner cannot prove that he was unaware of
the facts or their significance.
In Price v. Johnston,96 the Supreme Court held that under the old
habeas corpus statute, silent on the question of successive petitions, no significance was to be attached to a denial of a prior habeas corpus petition
based on different grounds 97-- grounds as defined by Judge Fahy-and
that the Government must raise the issue of abuse; in other words, the
prisoner was not required to plead an excuse for not presenting the claim
in an earlier petition.9 8 Taking into account the prisoner's legal inability,
the Court placed the initial burden of showing abuse on the Government,
9
oJudge Prettyman held that the lower court abused its discretion in "the legal
sense of that term" by not entertaining the motion which presented a claim of mental
incompetency at the time of trial. 270 F.2d at 929, 931. What precisely was the abuse
is difficult to discern. See 73 HARv. L. REv. 1225, 1227 (1960). However, Judge
Prettyman did list the failure of the prisoner to justify why he did not assert his
rights earlier as one condition for establishing a motion as a "successive" one which
the court need not entertain. 270 F2d at 929.
91Id. at 926-27.
92 judge Fahy said these would be "relevant factors." Id. at 926. Judge Prettyman equated his views with those of the court in Turner v. United States, 258 F.2d
165 (D.C. Cir. 1958), which suggested those justifications.
9 See Marchese v. United States, 304 F2d 154, 156-57 (9th Cir. 1962), petition
for cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. We=. 3071 (U.S. Aug. 22, 1962) (No. 362) (prisoner
must allege he was previously unaware of significant facts or unable to assert new
legal grounds) ; Trumblay v. United States, 278 F. 2d 229 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 840 (1960).
9
4 See, e.g., Pellom v. United States, 304 F2d 447, 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
83 Sup. Ct. 260 (1962); Bistram v. United States, 283 F2d 1, 3 (8th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 921 (1961).
!95 See Sanders v. United States, 297 F.2d 735, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
granted, 370 U.S. 936 (1962); Kesel v. Reid, 283 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 921 (1961) (habeas corpus).
96334 U.S. 266 (1948).
97 Id. at 288-89.
98 Id. at 291-92.
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reasoning that the prisoner would be better able to respond to arguments for
dismissal urged by the Government than to establish no abuse at the outset.
The legislative history of the 1948 habeas corpus statute suggests this
sequence of pleading for both habeas corpus and section 2255. The Judicial
Conference Committee which drafted the pertinent habeas corpus clause
intended to require the prisoner to state in his first petition all the grounds
then known to him but to afford him unlimited opportunity to present at
any time any grounds thereafter discovered. 99 Therefore, the courts should
not automatically raise the question of abuse by requiring all successive
petitions to plead excuse; rather, they should be ready to investigate a claim
which on its face appears to warrant relief and rely on the government
agency charged with the duty of defending such claims to object when it
believes that the process is being abused.
D. Habeas Corpus Petitions: Pleading the Ineffectiveness
of the 2255 Remedy
A federal prisoner seeking release from an invalid sentence through
habeas corpus must plead and prove 100 that the 2255 remedy was or will be
"inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." The possibility of establishing such ineffectiveness after relief has been sought under
2255 is slight.'0 1 And it seems to be practically impossible to establish
ineffectiveness before proceeding under 2255, since the courts have generally endorsed the 2255 procedure and any showing of inadequacy would
have to depend on the facts of a particular motion.' 0 2 Nevertheless, a
petition for habeas corpus has been entertained before a 2255 motion in
two cases: in Mugavero v. Swope, 0 3 on a showing that a co-defendant had
pursued a 2255 motion on the same claim and failed; 104 and in Stidham v.
Swope,0 5 because the remedy under 2255 would unduly handicap the prisoner in view of the inaccessibility of the distant sentencing court and the
more time-consuming process of the 2255 remedy as compared to habeas
corpus. Both of these decisions were probably overruled sub silentio in
99 See Smith v. United States, 270 F.2d 921, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
100 E.g., Rice v. Clemmer, 242 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 924

(1957) ; King v. United States, 214 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Sorrentino v. Swope,
198 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1952).
101 In Breaton v. United States, 303 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1962), the court stated

that habeas corpus was available only if the prisoner was denied a constitutional
right in the 2255 proceeding. In United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d

681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954), the court announced a test of whether "it can be shown that
some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a Section 2255 proceeding from
affording the prisoner a full hearing and adjudication of his claim . . . ." In St
Clair v. Hiatt, 83 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ga.), affd per curiam, 177 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.
1949), habeas corpus was entertained on the merits when the shortcomings of the
2255 procedure were less than constitutional. But cf. Hart v. Hunter, 89 F. Supp.
153 (D. Kan. 1950).
102 St Clair v. Hiatt, 83 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd per curiam, 177 F2d

374 (5th Cir. 1949) ; see cases cited note 100 supra.
103 86 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Cal. 1949), rev'd on merits of substantive claim, 188
F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1951).
The habeas corpus court held that the 2255 decision was wrong on the merits.
105 82 F. Supp. 931 (D. Cal. 1949).
104
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United States v. Hayman,10 6 in which the Supreme Court indicated that a
prisoner in all cases must proceed first under 2255 since appropriate judicial
handling of the 2255 motion can make it equivalent to habeas corpus. With
07
respect to the distance point, Stidham has been expressly rejected.
There may be cases, however, in which a habeas corpus petition demonstrates on its face the probable shortcomings of a 2255 proceeding and
should, therefore, be immediately heard. Such a case was United States
ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis,08 in which the prisoner was incarcerated in the
sentencing district and claimed that the sentence was invalid because the
trial judge had kept the jury deliberating through the night without food
until a verdict was returned. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recognized that it might be in the prisoner's interest to have a judge other
than the trial judge hear the claim, yet dismissed the habeas corpus petition, after the judge who entertained it had invalidated the conviction, because a 2255 motion had not been sought. Since the prisoner must exhaust
his 2255 channel by appeal to a court of appeals 109 and probably an attempt
at certiorari 110 before returning to habeas corpus, this prejudicial delay
should outweigh the formalities of procedure, especially in Leguillou, in
which the 2255 motion would have to be heard in the same lower court
1
as that to which petitioner had presented his bid for habeas corpus."
III.

DECIDING THE MOTION ON THE BASIS OF THE

"FILES AND REcoRDs"
At common law, habeas corpus was used only to challenge the competency of the trial court, and investigation was restricted to the records
surrounding the conviction." 2 Congress in 1867 113 expanded the scope of
the writ beyond the record, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
4
As a result, in a
permitted claims grounded on facts dehors the record."
2255 cognate proceeding the record is now used primarily to rebut or otherwise defeat the motion's factual allegations.
A. Established Uses of the Trial Record
If facts of record directly rebut the prisoner's allegations-for example,
the record might state that an indictment was returned or that defendant
106 342 U.S. 205. 220-24 (1952).
107Black v. United States, 301 F.2d 418 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 932
(1962).
108 212 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1954).
109 E.g., Kaufman v. Wilkinson, 237 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1956) (per curiam);
Bozell v. Welch, 203 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1953).
110 Breaton v. United -States, 303 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1962).
111But see Birchfield v. United States, 296 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1961), in which
the court indicated that the prisoner had a valid claim but that he should return to
the sentencing court which previously had twice denied motions.
11z2x parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) ; see United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205, 210-12 (1952) ; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879).
113 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
114
See note 7 supra and accompanying text
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was arraigned although the prisoner has asserted just the opposite-, the
claim is dismissed without further investigation." 5 If the record reveals
that the factual issue raised in the motion was determined at trial adversely
to the prisoner, such as when a hearing on competency has been held, the
issue may not be relitigated," 6 assuming the trial determination was based
on something more than a perfunctory investigation."' 7 As on an appeal,
the record may also be used to establish that the facts alleged, although
true, were not so prejudicial as to warrant relief.-""
B. More Expansive Use of the Trial Record
The greatest conflict in 2255 decisions has arisen when courts have
ventured beyond the traditional uses of the "files and records" by drawing
inferences which serve as a basis for disbelieving the facts alleged or by
relying on the records to preclude a hearing on the merits because of the
prisoner's failure to raise the claim at trial.
1. Drawing Inferences From the Record
In Machibrodav. United States,"9 the prisoner claimed that his guilty
plea was involuntary since it was based on a promise by an assistant United
States Attorney that he would receive a sentence of no more than twenty
years. 12 Although admitting that the facts alleged, if true, entitled the
prisoner to relief, the district court refused to believe him. From his failure to mention the agreement in a letter previously received by the court
11G See, e.g., Black v. United States, 269 F._d 38, 42 (9th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1960) (record showed indictment was returned, bail was set,
defendant was arraigned and given copy of indictment); Tatum v. United States,
204 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 976 (1953) (record showed sentences
consecutive, not concurrent).
116See Hill v. United States, 223 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350

U.S. 11867 (1956).

7 See Callahan v. United States, 297 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Bostic v. United
States, 298 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
11 See, e.g., Burley v. United States, 295 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1961) (being
absent at certain stages of trial not prejudicial) ; Armpriester v. United States, 256
F.2d 294 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958) (admission of illegal confession
after guilty plea not prejudicial).
119 184 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 280 F.2d 379 (6th
Cir. 1960), vacated and retmanded, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
120 The promises were alleged to have been made on three separate occasions:
before arraignment, before sentencing, and after sentencing. The first was said to have
been made with agreement of the court, and petitioner was advised not to tell his
lawyer. On the second occasion, he was allegedly told that because of his testimony
in favor of a co-defendant, the trial judge was "vexed" and thus there might be
difficulty in obtaining the promised sentence, but nonetheless he should wait until
sixty days after the sentencing and should not "make a scene," for there were several
unsettled matters concerning other crimes in which he was involved. The assistant
United States Attorney allegedly made the same assurances at the third meeting.
Petitioner also alleged that he sent two letters to the court and two to the Attorney
General concerning the breach of the agreement; the last named letters were not
found in the government files. In the answer filed to the motion, it was admitted
that the prisoner was visited, but only once and for the purpose of discussing his
testimony at his co-defendant's trial. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 7-8, Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-92 (1962).
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and from his failure to raise the matter at all for almost two and one-half
years, the court inferred that no promises were made.' 12 On the basis of
the prisoner's recorded answer that it was his desire to plead guilty, the
court also determined that the plea was in fact voluntary. 122 The Supreme
Court did not pass on the validity of the latter inference; it ordered a
hearing, holding that the record could shed no light on whether the promises were made since they allegedly occurred out of court.M' The dissenting
justices were persuaded by the lower court's inferences that no promises
were made.124 Thus, the Court divided on the propriety of disbelieving the
basic facts alleged at this stage of the proceedings, with the majority reserving permissible disbelief for claims which are not merely improbable but
incredible.

125

Obviously, the validity of denying a claim without a hearing on the
basis of such disbelief depends on whether there are enough factors present
-inferences from the record being only one-to give rise to the conclusive
determination demanded by the statute. One would expect that because
an appellate court is further removed from the burden imposed by frivolous
motions, it would be less likely to hold any given number of factors conclusive. 126 The Supreme Court's order of a hearing in Machibroda,despite
the presence of several factors supporting disbelief,'12 7 demonstrates that
denial of a motion without a hearing because of lack of credibility in order
to alleviate the frivolous motion workload can be self-defeating since it may
often result in an extra appeal and a remand of the case. In some cases,
district judges have apparently been so predisposed to deny motions on the
basis of inferences from the record that they have reversed the statutory
language by refusing to grant hearings unless the record substantiated the
claim when recorded corroboration should not have been expected. This
28
practice has been almost uniformly rejected on appeal.
2. Barring 2255 Relief for Failure To Raise the Claim at Trial
a. Coercion
Several courts seem to have adopted a rule denying a 2255 hearing
on the validity of a guilty plea to an accused who had retained his own
counsel and remained silent when questioned by the trial judge, pursuant
21

184 F. Supp. at 883-84.

1= Id.at

885.

368 U.S. at 494-95.
124 Id. at 497-500.
= Id. at 496.
M See, e.g., Gregory v. United States, 233 F2d 907 (5th Cir. 1956)
(per
curiam); Martin v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1949).
127 In addition to the failure of the letters to substantiate his claim, the alleged
promises supposedly occurred after the prisoner had testified in favor of his codefendant and before he indicated an intention to plead guilty. See 368 U.S. at 499,
500 (dissenting opinion).
128 See, e.g., Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1962) ; McGuire
v. United States, 289 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1961).
123
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to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to ensure that his
plea was voluntary and intelligent. 2 9 Other prisoners have been refused
hearings when the trial judge's investigation of volition appears to have
been perfunctory. 30
Automatic denial of a hearing on a claim of coerced guilty plea cannot
be defended even if the trial court made a detailed attempt to comply with
Rule 11. Rule 11 was intended as a safeguard against untrustworthy pleas
which are not a genuine expression of the defendant's will, for a guilty plea
"is itself a conviction." 131 Certainly a prisoner can be expected to try all
means to regain his freedom. Nevertheless, to rationalize denial of a hearing on the theory that an accused's statements at a formal trial are more
reliable than those now made by him as a prisoner ' 3 2 ignores the fact
that one effectively threatened or coerced at the time of trial cannot be
expected to have voiced that fact in offering his plea. 3 3 In Moore v.
Michigan,134 the Supreme Court recognized that even if a trial judge confers with the accused in camera before accepting his guilty plea, he cannot
be assured that the prisoner's actions are freely motivated. Thus, on a
claim of coerced guilty plea, the prisoner's recorded responses at trial should
129 See, e.g., United States v. Koptik, 300 F.2d 19 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 957 (1962); Swepston v. United States, 289 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1962); Meredith v. United States, 208 F.2d 680 (4th Cir.
1953) (per curiam); cf. Johnson v. United States, 301 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1962)
(alleged failure to comply with Rule 11) ; Adkins v. United States, 298 F.2d 842 (8th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 954 (1962) (same grounds); White v.
Taylor, 164 F. Supp. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (alleged incompetent counsel).
130 See, e.g., United States v. Jacek, 298 F.2d 429 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 952 (1962) (prisoner stated he knew no reason why sentence should
not be imposed) ; United States v. Smith, 257 F.2d 432 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 926 (1959) (prisoner replied yes when asked whether he wanted to change
plea and knew what he was doing) ; Garcia v. United States, 197 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1952) (per curiam) (prisoner was willing to proceed with guilty plea); Hart v.
United States, 178 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 985
(1950) (prisoner had nothing to say when plea entered); cf. Burgett v. United
States, 237 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957) (allegedly
vaived indictment because of threats and promises).
131 See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) ; United States
v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1954).
132 This appears to be the basis of denial in the cases in which the trial judge
did not make a detailed attempt to comply with Rule 11. See, e.g., United States
v. Smith, 257 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 926 (1959) ; Crowe v.
United States, 175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950).
In the cases in which the trial judge made a detailed attempt, it is not clear whether
the decisions rest on credibility or on a finding that the records show that the plea
was in fact voluntary. See cases cited note 129 supra. Compare Kimbrough v.
United States, 226 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1955) (conclusion from records that prisoner
pleaded guilty to obtain a lesser sentence).
'33 See United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir.
1960) (hearing held even though prisoner at trial said no promises were made);
Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955) (prisoner afforded hearing
even though he said he was not coerced at trial). See also Motley v. United States,
230 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1956) (hearing awarded prisoner who personally entered
plea); Aiken v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 43 (M.D.N.C.), aft'd, 296 F.2d 604
(1961). Compare cases cited note 130 supra.
'34 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
The Court reversed a state court's denial of a motion
for a new trial, holding that the fact that a sheriff had told the accused of possible
mob violence should he plead not guilty raised an inference of fact that refusal of
counsel was motivated by fear.
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be merely the starting point for the court's investigation of the merits of the
claim, not the basis of an inference that the basic facts alleged-that threats
were made-are untrue. Nor should the defendant's apparent sophistication and understanding of the gravity of his plea as shown on the record
by his answers to Rule 11 questioning be the sole support for a conclusion
as to the ultimate fact that the plea was voluntary even if the alleged threats
were made, for the defendant might have been subjected to duress so severe
as to have rendered the questioning ineffectual as well as to have undermined his freedom of choice. In light of the Supreme Court's strict rules
in the area of coerced confessions, 3 5 its past decisions recognizing the
prisoner's need to present claims of coercion by collateral attack, 3 6 and its
statement in Machibrodathat even a plea based only on a promise can be
void, 37 a defendant allegedly exposed to such pressures should be given the
opportunity to prove at a hearing that the trial court's probing pursuant to
Rule 11 did not overcome the effect of the threats. 38
b. Promises
Different questions arise when the plea allegedly resulted from a promise by the prosecutor unaccompanied by threats and the trial court has
again complied with Rule 11. The Court in Machibroda declared that a
plea "induced by promises . . . which deprive it of the character of a
voluntary act, is void." 139 In the sense that the bargaining prisoner chose
from among alternatives without intimidation, his decision both to accept
the bargain and not to raise the issue at trial could be termed voluntary.
Yet a promise to seek a light sentence is essentially the converse of a threat
to seek the maximum, and the effect on the prisoner's choice is only more
subtle.14 A prisoner who has bargained for a light sentence has been subjected to an inducement at least sufficient to preclude a court from automatically concluding that if the facts alleged were true he would have raised
the issue at trial. Actually, the court's basic concern should be with the
' 35 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
13GIn Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942), the Sipreme Court held

that if a plea was so coerced as to invalidate a conviction, the prisoner could not be
said to have waived his right to attack the conviction. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 467 (1938). It is to be expected that a period of time must elapse before
the effectively coerced defendant can overcome his fear.
'37 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).

138 One court has approved the procedure of taking the prisoner's deposition to
supplement the record. See Kimbrough v. United States, 226 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1955). Although it is unlikely that a prisoner could adequately explain his motivations in a deposition, at least information could be obtained about his background
and the circumstances under which the threats were made.
'39 368 U.S. at 493.
140 Perhaps it is because this subtle effect is lacking that some courts have held
that a prisoner relies at his own risk on promises from those without the power to
commit him. Compare Jackson v. United States, 214 F2d 485 (4th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954), and Meredith v. United States, 208 F.2d 680 (4th
Cir. 1953), and United States v. Paglia, 190 F2d 445, 448 (2d Cir. 1951), with
Hassell v. United States, 287 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1961) (per curiam), and Andrews v.
United States, 286 F2d 829 (5th Cir. 1961), and Aiken v. United States, 191 F. Supp.
43 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 296 F2d 604 (1961).
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ultimate issue of voluntariness, an issue the Court in Machibroda could not
reach because the trial court's questioning was perfunctory.
Under the Machibroda test, the mere fact that a promise was made
does not necessarily mean that the plea was not voluntary. On the other
hand, the fact that the trial court did not comply with Rule 11 does not
necessarily vitiate a plea; in such a case, the issue of voluntariness is decided
at a 2255 hearing with the burden of proof on the prosecutor.' 41 A 2255
court is permitted to decide the ultimate fact of volition from the records
when they are relevant and meaningful; unlike the coercion cases, the pressures exerted on the defendant are not so offensive as to require a hearing in
every case. Even if the court accepts as true the basic facts alleged by the
prisoner, the Rule 11 questioning at trial may nonetheless show that the
prisoner made an open-minded choice, having been fully advised and understanding that the inducement was improper, or that he chose to plead
guilty because of his guilt and not because of the promise.
Which of these two showings a court will demand from the records on
collateral attack depends, of course, on its interpretation of the Machibroda
1 42
"voluntary act" test, and indeed, the lower courts have split on this issue.
Whether the prisoner had an opportunity to raise his claim on appeal because the promise had been broken may be a crucial factor.143 The propriety of the prosecutor's alleged actions should be a relevant factor, however, only insofar as it relates to the prisoner's volition, for a congenial
prosecutor may have a greater impact on the defendant than one who
engages in improper harassment.144 Since a prisoner is unable to invalidate
a plea on collateral attack solely because his own counsel advised him to
plead guilty,145 he should also be denied relief if the records indicate that
141 See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 112 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing
en banc, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam on confession of error, 356
U.S. 26 (1958).
142 Ibid. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Dillon v. United States,
307 F.2d 445 (1962).
143 Unlike the coercion cases, see note 136 supra, it may be expected that the
prisoner would present the matter to the trial court or on appeal if his plea was based
on a bargain that was not kept. See Young v. United States, 228 F.2d 693 (8th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 913 (1956) ; Aiken v. United States, 191
F. Supp. 43, 50 (M.D.N.C.), affd, 296 F.2d 604 (1961). But see the claim made in
Machibroda, note 120 supra.
144 Compare Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1959), in which the
court not only confused the issue of whether the plea was voluntary with the question
of the defendant's apparent guilt, but also attempted to differentiate illegal from legal
coercion based on whether the accused was confronted with the possible exercise of
the prosecutor's legitimate power. The latter distinction is noticeably absent from
other opinions on point. See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.
1962) (promise by prosecutor to recommend a sentence sufficient inducement); Andrews v. United States, 286 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1961) (hearing ordered on alleged
FBI promise to drop other charges); Hassell v. United States, 287 F.2d 646 (9th
Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (promise not to prosecute co-defendant wife).
145When a prisoner claims that his plea was invalid because his counsel did
not adequately advise him, the courts deny relief unless it appears that the lawyer
did not take into account the prisoner's interest when advising him. A similar inquiry
could be made in reviewing the trial court's Rule 11 questioning. See United States
v. Berry, 309 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1962) (immaterial that counsel said judge was prejudiced when different judge sentenced); Alexander v. United States, 290 F.2d 252
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the trial judge accepted his plea with approximately the same solicitude
for his interests as counsel would have provided. But since the unadvised
defendant may be easily overwhelmed by the seeming advantages of accepting a deal if unaware of the complexities involved in obtaining a conviction,
the trial judge should place in the record evidence of questioning going
beyond mere inquiry into whether threats or promises were made. 146
3. Suggested Trial Procedure for Making a Proper Record
If the accused is without counsel, the district judge should take this
into account when explaining his rights and endeavor to act almost as a
substitute.

47

If the accused has counsel, the judge should not assume that

the prisoner has been fully informed. 48 Proper questioning of the accused
might contribute to a record which could sufficiently offset a claim such as
that made in Machibroda-thatthe prisoner was warned not to inform his
counsel of the bargain. 149 In addition, the accused should receive a complete
explanation of his rights from the commissioner at the preliminary hearing
because most threats or bargains are made in the interval between hearing
and trial. The judge might seek information on the background of the
accused so that he could be better equipped to explain meaningfully the
consequences of the available alternatives. The accused should be informed
of the possible penalties flowing from a guilty plea, the finality of the plea
itself, and the weight the particular judge gives to a prosecutor's recommendations for sentence, as well as the Government's burden of proof following a not guilty plea and the accused's auxiliary rights, such as compelling attendance of witnesses. Not only should the judge make clear to
the accused that this is his last opportunity to reveal any pertinent facts,
but he should also put into the record statements by the accused in response
to detailed probing rather than a mere recital of the offenses charged.
These practices should not unduly burden a trial judge and could
lead to a thorough record which might be relied on at least to obviate a 2255
claim that the prisoner did not in fact understand the nature and consequences of his plea, for it is unlikely that a prisoner could.allege new facts
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 891 (1961) (justified opinion by lawyer that there
was no chance of acquittal, although mistaken, does not vitiate plea); Moore v.
United States, 249 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (plea following lawyer's
advice that case could be won on appeal valid) ; Meredith v. United States, 208 F2d
680 (4th Cir. 1953) (per curiam) (plea following advice that defendant would receive
a light sentence valid). Compare McGuire v. United States, 289 F2d 405 (9th Cir.
1961) (lawyer advised defendant to plead guilty without investigating alleged coercon) ; Motley v. United States, 230 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1956) (lawyer's statement
that guilty plea would mean a lighter sentence sufficient inducement); Mays v. United
States, 216 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (trickery and fraud); Wheatley
v. United States, 198 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1952) (lawyer advised there was no chance
of acquittal). See also Heideman v. United States, 281 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1960).
146 The majority in Machibroda did not even discuss the district court's finding
that the plea was voluntary when the only inquiry at trial was whether it was the
defendant's desire to plead guilty. Compare cases cited note 130 supra.
147 See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1962).
148 See United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1954).
149 See 368 U.S. at 489.
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which would undermine the trial court's extensive attempt to ensure understanding. 150 Such records might also enable a 2255 court to decide, as
would a trial judge, whether the plea was voluntary, accepting the new
facts pleaded as true and not limiting the issue to whether the prisoner had
a sufficient opportunity to raise the claim at trial.

IV. PRODUCTION OF THE PRISONER AT A HEARING
A. The 2255 Clause and Its Habeas
Corpus Counterpart
The 2255 statute requires a hearing if the issues raised by the prisoner's motion are not concluded by the files and records in the trial court,
and it is then necessary to determine whether the prisoner must himself be
present. Whereas it is the very function of the writ of habeas corpus to
cause the petitioner to be produced before the court, and the habeas corpus
statute 5 1 requires that the writ issue in all cases in which disposition of
the petition ultimately turns on substantial issues of fact, 52 section 2255
gives the court discretion in deciding whether to require the production of
the prisoner. "A court may entertain and determine such motion without
requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing." This is the most
significant distinction between the two statutes and was the subject of the
first Supreme Court decision interpreting the procedural framework of
section 2255.
In United States v. Hayuan,tm the prisoner filed a motion under 2255
alleging ineffective counsel in that his lawyer without his knowledge had
also represented a defendant in a related case who was a principal witness
against him. On the basis of an ex parte hearing without notice to the
prisoner, the district court denied the motion, finding that the conflicting
representation was with the knowledge, consent, and at the request of the
prisoner.1 54 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the district
court's proceeding adequate under the terms of the statute but sua sponte
held that the 2255 procedure could not be adequate or effective in this case
since the district court had no power to produce the prisoner, and that in
the alternative, the statute amounted to an unconstitutional suspension of
habeas corpus.'x
On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit treated section 2255 as
1S0 A claim by the prisoner that he simply did not understand does not appear to
warrant relief on collateral attack. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 283 F2d 245
(5th Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (unintelligent waiver of counsel); Hines v. United
States, 203 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1953) (per curiam). The determinative question is
whether the trial judge sufficiently explained his rights. Compare Vellky v. United
States, 279 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1960), with Starks v. United States, 264 F.2d 797
(4th Cir. 1959) (per curiam).

'5128 U.S.C. §2243 (1958).

152 The Reviser's Notes to § 2243 indicate that the 1948 revision was intended
to adopt the standard of Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
'53 342 U.S. 205 (1952).

154

See id. at 208-09.

155 Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1950).
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a nullity and refused to take further action on the prisoner's motion even
though the Government conceded that the motion raised factual issues requiring his presence. 156 The Supreme Court held that the district court
did have the power to produce the prisoner 157 and rejected the Ninth
Circuit's finding that the court's procedure was adequate under the terms of
the statute. Since the files and records did not determine the issues raised,
the statute required that the movant be given a hearing; therefore, the case
was remanded for a new hearing with the prisoner present. Thus, the
Court did not reach the constitutional question, reasoning that there was no
basis for a finding at this stage of the proceedings that the 2255 remedy was
"inadequate or ineffective" and that even if.it was, the statute expressly left
open the habeas corpus channel. 158 Hayman limited the court's discretion,
which theretofore had appeared almost unrestricted, 59 by requiring production of a prisoner who has personal knowledge of controverted issues of
fact. Generally, the limitation has been followed, but the courts have been
160
reluctant to apply tests more favorable to the prisoner.
B. The Effect of Machibroda
In this context, Machibroda is significant in that although it came
within the Hayman limitation-the prisoner had personal knowledge of
whether the prosecutor had contacted him and made a promise-, the Court
without mentioning Haynan allowed the lower court on remand to decide
whether the prisoner should be produced. 161 On the other hand, in Ladner
156 Ibid.
157 The Court found the power in the Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1958).
342 U.S.
at 221.
5
1 8 Id. at 223.
159 See Crowe v. United States, 175 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); United States v. Cameron, 84 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.
Miss. 1949).
100 See, e.g., United States v. McNicholas, 298 F.2d 914 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 878 (1962); McDonald v. United States, 282 F.2d 737, 743-44 (9th Cir.
1960); Thomas v. United States, 271 F2d 500, 501-02 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Hodge v.
United States, 217 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1954) (per curiam), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 959
(1955); Richardson v. United States, 217 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
The Hayman opinion does not preclude a statutory interpretation of 2255 that would
require presence whenever disposition of the motion depends on a contested issue of
fact, regardless of whether the prisoner had personal knowledge. In fact, the Court
noted that its interpretation of the 2255 clause was in accord with habeas corpus
procedure. 342 U.S. at 222, citing Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950). In dictum, the Barrett court interpreted the clause as
permitting a court to refuse presence when the case is decided on the basis of the
records, when presence is unnecessary to afford the prisoner the relief to which he
is entitled, or when only issues of law are presented. Id. at 514. Since these conditions are comparable to those stated in Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 284 (1941),
for which a habeas corpus writ to produce the prisoner need not issue, the Barrett
opinion suggests that the right to be present is identical under either remedy. See
180 F.2d at 517-18 (dissenting opinion). The legislative history can be read as indicating that the purpose of the 2255 presence clause was only to enable a court to
decide a motion when presence would not have been required under habeas corpus;
but if habeas corpus procedure would require presence and the prisoner could not be
produced, the court should transmit the case to the confinement district. See United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 215-19, 215 n23, 217 n.25 (1952).
161 368 U.S. at 495-96.
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v. United States,6 2 the Court held that a prisoner is entitled to be present
at a hearing on the issue of whether the evidence at his trial, for which
there was no transcript, showed that no more than one shot was fired in a
multiple murder. Machibroda can be distinguished, however, from Ladner
and Hayman since only in Machibroda was there a possibility of further
investigating the truth of the facts alleged before determining whether to
have the prisoner produced. The court could seek independent verification
from the county jail's visitor record to establish whether the prosecutor had
visited him and from the prison's mail records and possibly the Attorney
163
General's files to determine if he had sent letters to the Attorney General.
Thus viewed, Machibroda is not a rejection of the Hayman limitation,
but a recognition by the Court that this was the first 2255 case brought
before it in which it was possible to evaluate the prisoner's projected evi64
dence at a hearing as under the "show cause" procedure of habeas corpus.
And, as in habeas corpus,

65

production of the prisoner would then depend

on whether a substantial issue of fact remained after further investigation,
67
66
a determination already made and accepted in Hayman' and Ladner.
As in the case of challenging a judge's recollections, 68 the proper test for
determining substantiality seems to be whether the prisoner's testimony
could in no event overcome the evidence uncovered at the hearing. 69 The
utility of such a hearing, to be sure, depends on the circumstances of the
case, and although it may help to eliminate "joy rides" on fictitious claims,
at the same time it will impose an additional workload on the courts in cases
in which it is concluded that the prisoner should be produced.
C. The Consequences of a 2255 Court's Failure
To Have the Prisoner Produced
By interpreting the discretionary presence clause as requiring production of the prisoner on the facts of the case before it, the Court in Hayman
162358 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1958).
See note 120 supra.
See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 284 (1941) ; Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d
857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945). Compare cases cited note 169
infra.
165 Walker v. Johnston, supra note 164, at 286.
166 342 U.S. at 210.
167 See 358 U.S. at 178-79.
168 See notes 72, 77 supra and accompanying text.
169 The cases seem to distinguish between uncovering evidence of a different
quality from the prisoner's testimony and uncovering evidence that assists only in a
quantum determination. See Taylor v. United States, 303 F.2d 165, 169 (4th Cir.
1962) (produce prisoner when findings depend on memory). Compare United States
v. McDowell, 305 F.2d 12, 14 (6th Cir. 1962) (prisoner's testimony as to contents
cannot contradict the certification of the record) ; United States v. Davis, 286 F.2d
370 (7th Cir. 1961) (presence not required after receipt of doctor's affidavit that a
certain drug could not possibly have had an adverse effect); McDonald v. United
States, 282 F.2d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 1960) (prisoner not required when testimony
hearsay). But see Crowe v. United States, 175 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1949) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950) (prisoner not entitled to testify to whether
he was threatened).
163
164
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left unresolved the question of the application of the "inadequate and ineffective" clause to a particular case in which the prisoner is not produced. One
district court has held in broad terms that a failure to have the prisoner
produced in a 2255 proceeding can not be the subject of collateral attack, 17
although Hayman stated that habeas corpus is available. 171 The gravity of
post-conviction proceedings argues for an independent judgment by the
habeas corpus court of the effectiveness of the 2255 remedy in a particular
case when the prisoner has not been produced. The absence of a statutory
right to be present under 2255 should not preclude either the 2255 or the
habeas corpus court from meaningfully applying the discretionary presence
clause in terms of the prisoner's interest in presenting his claim, especially
in light of Hayman's definition of the 2255 "hearing" as one in the "judicial
tradition."
If a prisoner has a constitutional right to be produced at a post-conviction hearing on the factual issues he has raised, the "inadequate and ineffective" clause would surely have to be interpreted to afford habeas corpus
to the 2255 movant who has been denied presence. If the prisoner has no
constitutional right to be produced, a court entertaining a habeas corpus
petition after the prisoner has been denied presence at a 2255 hearing is
free to uphold the 2255 court's exercise of discretion.
D. Possible Constitutional Requirements
The right to be present at a post-conviction hearing has two possible
constitutional sources-the "suspension clause" of article I, section 9, and
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The sixth amendment
affords no such right.172
The nature of the "privilege" of habeas corpus that cannot be suspended
has never been dearly defined by statute. The constitutional framers
seemed to have envisioned the privilege as only the basic one of collaterally
challenging the legality of detention. 73 It has been argued that even this
basic right is not constitutional but statutory; 174 assuming, however, that
it is constitutional, the very word "privilege" and the congressional power
over article III courts indicate that Congress has the power to determine
the scope of the right to collateral attack, subject, of course, to other constitutional limitations.175 Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that in
1 70
United States v. Winhoven, 14 F.R.D. 18, 20 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed,
209 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1953) (motion under Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure). Compare Hart v. Hunter, 89 F. Supp. 153, 155 (D. Kan. 1950) (habeas
corpus) (not entitled to production to offer evidence not inconsistent with record).
171 See 342 U.S. at 223.
172
See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 222 (1952); Barber v. United
States, 142 F.2d 805, 806-07 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 741 (1944).
173 See Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. Rxv. 335, 339-44 (1952).
'74 Id. at 340, 346, 357.
175 See United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 902 (1954). See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL Sys= 333-39, 1232-68 (1953) ; Collings, supra note 173, at 346.
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interpreting the habeas corpus statute the ancient common-law practice sur76
rounding the writ is irrelevant."
If, under the suspension clause, presence is a right commensurate with
the right to challenge the validity of commitment, it is difficult to rationalize
the limitation of that right to cases involving factual issues. It could be
argued that if the challenge is based on questions of fact, the basic right to
challenge the conviction includes the right to prove the facts asserted; since
the prisoner may be unable to meet his burden of proof without being
present, his right to challenge is suspended unless he is produced. But the
fact that in 1789 there was no habeas corpus right to raise issues of fact
dehors the record 177 seems to dispose of the suspension clause as a possible
base for such an argument. The case for a constitutional right to be present
must, then, be grounded on notions of fundamental fairness.
In unsubstantiated dictum, two courts have noted that due process
requires presence at a hearing on issues of fact. 178 Another court 17 9 has
concluded that production is solely within a court's discretion by analogizing
to Price v. Johnston.8 0 In Price,the Supreme Court held that an appellate
court has the discretionary power to produce a habeas corpus petitioner for
argument on appeal. But the issues decided on appeal are normally questions of law springing from the facts found in the lower court or questions
relating to the sufficiency of the evidence. Certainly, it is by no means
inconsistent to hold that due process requires presence at the time when
the basic facts are to be presented and determined but not necessarily at the
time when the legal rulings thereon are to be reconsidered and finalized.
Due process may very well require presence when decision on the
motion turns on a contested issue of fact involving a situation to which the
prisoner was a party-the Hayman situation.' 8 ' In such a case, the findings
of fact will ultimately depend on a credibility evaluation. Unless the prisoner has the opportunity personally to present his version of the incident
along with his demeanor, his chances of carrying his burden of proof are
small, especially if his is the only testimony to support his claim.
If the prisoner establishes a prima facie claim that his commitment
was the result of improper action by a court or its officer, for *example,that
the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, an argument can be
made that fundamental fairness requires his presence whether or not he
has personal knowledge of the facts. In a sense, his opportunities to defend
himself through presence at trial were undercut by the actions of an arm of
the institution that was to decide his guilt; on collateral attack, presence
should be granted, therefore, even if not ultimately compelled by due procv. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 285 (1941).
See text accompanying note 114 suipra.
178Ex parte Rosier, 133 F.2d 316, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1942); United States v.
Landicho, 72 F. Supp. 425, 429 (D. Alaska 1947).
'79 United States v. Koptik, 300 F.2d 19 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 957
176 Walker
177

(1962).
180 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
181

See Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1950).
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ess, to give the prisoner possibly his first full and fair hearing free of
governmental impropriety.
Aside from testifying, presence provides the prisoner with the opportunity "to confront witnesses, to ask his own witnesses questions, to crossexamine the government's witnesses, and to prompt his counsel, if he has
one." 182 However, these further advantages may not be sufficient to support a general due process requirement of presence in all cases in which
the prisoner has no personal knowledge. Appointment of counsel may be
an adequate alternative. With counsel, the prisoner is completely denied
only the opportunity to confront witnesses, which may not be prejudicial
if he was not personally involved in the factual dispute to be resolved.
Moreover, the very purpose of confrontation, at least at trail, has been
equated with the right to test the recollection of witnesses during crossexamination and has not been given an independent status.lss
E. Exercising Discretion Under the Presence Clause

Even if the considerations discussed above do not rise to due process
proportions, they are still basic to the exercise of a sound discretion in
considering the presence issue.
Two recent cases have questioned the validity of the decisions which
hold that there is no constitutional right to counsel in a post-conviction
proceeding, and have held that in cases in which the factual issues are
sufficiently complex, a hearing cannot be meaningful unless the prisoner
has counsel, even if the prisoner was present.18 4 They reject the rationale
that the purpose of counsel is only to aid the court in determining the
facts, 85 recognizing that the "judicial tradition" relied on in Hayman also
demands that the prisoner be enabled to present his case in its best light.
Similar reasoning should be applied to the 2255 presence clause, for failure
to give full play to a prisoner's interests may lead to a hearing so superficial
as to be in effect no hearing at all.
V. COCLUSION
The 2255 remedy can afford a prisoner every procedural benefit available under habeas corpus and necessary to a meaningful investigation of his
claim. Its terms are broad, no doubt intentionally so; the courts have the
task, therefore, of adapting it to the particularities of varied motions. Certainly the small number of prisoner successes under 2255 should not pre182 Green v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiarn,
256 F2d 483 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958).
8
1 3 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1934).
8
1 4 Dillon v. United States, 307 F2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) ; United States ex rel.
Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960).
18 5 The same rationale has been applied to the presence clause. See United States
v. Derosier, 229 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1956); Crowe v. United States, 175 F2d
799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950).
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dispose a court to view the claim before it as frivolous. Guarding against
frivolous motions is a harsh rationale for placing a particular movant under
a burden which will disadvantage him in the presentation of his claim.
Abuse of the court's processes should perhaps be deterred by having
the prisoner swear to his motion, thereby exposing the dishonest prisoner
to possible prosecution for false swearing while not impeding the good faith
movant in pressing his claim. Instead of enlarging the courts in the districts of confinement or establishing additional courts, Congress has chosen
to confer on the existing courts the responsibility of ensuring protection for
those who may have been improperly imprisoned. Therefore, notwithstanding the mounting quantitative burden, courts must administer the 2255
channel with sufficient flexibility to accommodate the sometimes inarticulate
and stumbling prisoner.
Joseph M. Bowman

